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Immigration	  and	  crime	  have	  received	  much	  popular	  and	  political	  attention	  in	  the	  past	  decade,	  
and	  have	  been	  a	  focus	  of	  episodic	  social	  attention	  for	  much	  of	  the	  history	  of	  the	  U.S.	  Recent	  policy	  and	  
legal	  discourse	  suggests	  that	  the	  stigmatic	  link	  between	  immigrants	  and	  crime	  has	  endured,	  even	  in	  the	  
face	  of	  evidence	  to	  the	  contrary.	  This	  study	  addresses	  the	  relationship	  between	  immigration	  and	  crime	  in	  
urban	  settings,	  focusing	  on	  areal	  units	  where	  immigrants	  tend	  to	  cluster	  spatially	  as	  well	  as	  socially.	  We	  
ask	  whether	  immigration	  creates	  risks	  or	  benefits	  for	  neighborhoods	  in	  terms	  of	  lower	  crime	  rates.	  The	  
question	  is	  animated	  in	  part	  by	  a	  durable	  claim	  in	  criminology	  that	  areas	  with	  large	  immigrant	  
populations	  are	  burdened	  by	  elevated	  levels	  of	  social	  disorder	  and	  crime.	  	  In	  contrast,	  more	  recent	  theory	  
and	  research	  suggests	  that	  “immigrant	  neighborhoods”	  may	  simply	  be	  differentially	  organized	  and	  
function	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  reduces	  the	  incidence	  of	  crime.	  	  Accordingly,	  this	  research	  investigates	  
whether	  immigrants	  are	  associated	  with	  differences	  in	  area	  crime	  rates.	  	  In	  addition,	  we	  ask	  whether	  
there	  are	  differences	  in	  the	  effects	  of	  immigration	  on	  neighborhood	  crime	  rates	  by	  the	  racial	  and	  ethnic	  
makeup	  of	  the	  foreign	  born	  populations.	  Finally,	  we	  examine	  the	  effects	  of	  immigration	  on	  patterns	  of	  
enforcement.	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Introduction	  
	   Historically,	  immigration	  has	  been	  associated	  with	  crime	  and	  other	  social	  ills	  in	  popular	  and	  
political	  culture	  (Hagan	  and	  Palloni	  1998;	  McDonald	  2009).	  Waves	  of	  immigration	  in	  the	  19th	  and	  20th	  
centuries	  brought	  with	  them	  moral	  panics	  on	  drugs	  and	  alcohol,	  gangs,	  delinquency,	  organized	  crime,	  
wage	  suppression,	  and	  drains	  on	  public	  resources	  (Hagan,	  Levi,	  and	  Dinovitzer	  2008;	  Sampson	  2008).	  
More	  recently,	  the	  presumed	  link	  to	  crime	  has	  provided	  a	  significant	  rationale	  for	  a	  variety	  of	  punitive	  
responses	  to	  immigration.	  In	  Arizona,	  the	  2010	  killing	  of	  Robert	  Krentz	  made	  tangible	  generalized	  
anxiety	  about	  immigrant	  crime	  (Archibold	  2010).	  Although	  no	  suspect	  was	  identified,	  speculation	  that	  
the	  killer	  was	  an	  illegal	  alien	  helped	  secure	  the	  passage	  of	  Arizona’s	  draconian	  (anti)immigration	  bill.	  The	  
spectre	  of	  immigrant-­‐crime	  similarly	  aided	  in	  generating	  public	  support	  for	  “copy	  cat”	  legislation	  in	  
Georgia	  and	  Alabama.	  Even	  laws	  that	  ostensibly	  were	  more	  about	  the	  economics	  of	  immigration,	  such	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as	  California’s	  Proposition	  187,	  nonetheless	  were	  buttressed	  by	  allusions	  not	  just	  to	  the	  potential	  for	  
financial	  burdens	  on	  labor	  markets,	  education	  and	  health	  care	  from	  illegal	  immigration,	  but	  also	  to	  
criminal	  activity	  among	  some	  illegal	  immigrants.	  	  
	   Thus,	  as	  part	  of	  the	  broader	  debate	  about	  immigration,	  the	  putative	  connection	  between	  
immigration	  crime	  is	  of	  considerable	  political	  and	  practical	  import.	  The	  presumptive	  connection	  has	  
motivated	  new	  efforts	  to	  link	  local	  law	  enforcement	  with	  immigration	  enforcement	  (Varsanyi,	  Lewis,	  
Provine,	  and	  Decker	  forthcoming).	  	  The	  new	  intersection	  of	  criminal	  enforcement	  with	  immigration	  has	  
led	  some	  scholars	  to	  label	  illegal	  immigration	  as	  “crimigration,”	  a	  linguistic	  and	  conceptual	  move	  to	  
broaden	  the	  mandate	  of	  local	  police	  to	  systematically	  and	  routinely	  engage	  in	  immigration	  enforcement	  
(Sklansky	  forthcoming).	  	  
Still,	  despite	  the	  recent	  involvement	  of	  local	  police	  in	  immigration	  enforcement,	  research	  and	  
theoretical	  interest	  in	  immigration	  in	  criminology	  has	  been	  episodic	  (Hagan,	  Levi,	  and	  Dinovitzer	  2008).	  
In	  the	  early	  20th	  century,	  immigration	  figured	  prominently	  in	  theories	  of	  neighborhood	  and	  crime,	  
particularly	  social	  disorganization	  (Shaw	  and	  McKay	  1943;	  Bursik	  1988;	  Bursik	  and	  Grasmick	  1993;	  
Sampson	  2008).	  Often	  arriving	  in	  poverty,	  many	  immigrants,	  principally	  from	  southern	  and	  eastern	  
Europe,	  were	  forced	  to	  settle	  in	  the	  poorest,	  areas	  of	  the	  city.	  Subsequently,	  immigrants	  were	  
scapegoated	  for	  the	  problems	  attendant	  with	  these	  urban	  slums.	  Studies	  of	  street	  gangs	  in	  the	  1920s	  in	  
Chicago	  depicted	  gang	  conflict	  as	  a	  function	  of	  ethnic	  and	  racial	  conflicts	  among	  first	  and	  second	  
generation	  immigrant	  youths	  (e.g.,	  Thrasher	  1927).	  	  The	  early	  juvenile	  courts	  in	  Chicago	  and	  other	  urban	  
areas	  targeted	  the	  children	  of	  immigrants	  for	  a	  paternalistic	  form	  of	  social	  control	  (Tanenhaus	  2004;	  
Platt	  1969;	  Sealander	  2003).	  Shaw	  and	  McKay’s	  (1943)	  critical	  insight	  was	  that	  rates	  of	  delinquency	  
remained	  pretty	  stable	  among	  Chicago's	  neighborhoods	  between	  1900	  and	  1933,	  despite	  dramatic	  
changes	  in	  the	  composition	  of	  these	  neighborhoods.	  In	  other	  words,	  crime	  rates	  were	  not	  contingent	  
upon	  the	  racial	  and	  ethnic	  make-­‐up	  of	  an	  area;	  rather,	  crime	  was	  related	  to	  neighborhood	  conditions,	  
specifically	  poverty,	  anonymity,	  and	  heterogeneity.	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  legacy	  of	  social	  disorganization	  in	  
relation	  to	  immigrants	  is	  somewhat	  mixed.	  On	  one	  hand,	  the	  theory	  offers	  a	  strong	  refutation	  of	  the	  
notion	  that	  immigrants	  are	  inherently	  criminal.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  theory	  does	  predict	  higher	  crime	  
rates	  in	  areas	  inhabited	  by	  newly	  arrived	  immigrants.	  
Interest	  in	  immigration	  among	  criminologists	  has	  ebbed	  and	  flowed	  with	  immigration	  itself.	  
Between	  the	  1920s	  and	  1965,	  restrictions	  on	  the	  number	  of	  immigrants	  entering	  the	  US	  pushed	  
immigration	  to	  the	  background.	  When	  the	  1965	  amendments	  to	  the	  Immigration	  and	  Nationality	  Act	  
ended	  quotas	  based	  on	  nationality,	  immigration	  rates	  leaped	  dramatically,	  and	  the	  stigmatic	  link	  
between	  immigration	  and	  crime	  again	  became	  part	  of	  the	  political	  and	  popular	  discourse	  on	  
immigration.	  	  Still,	  interest	  in	  immigration	  among	  criminologists	  was	  has	  revived	  only	  in	  the	  last	  decade,	  
as	  theories	  of	  neighborhoods	  (Sampson,	  Morenoff,	  and	  Gannon-­‐Rowley	  2002)	  and	  social	  networks	  
(Kasinitz,	  Mollenkopf,	  and	  Waters	  2009)	  began	  to	  incorporate	  the	  unique	  contexts	  of	  immigration.	  Much	  
of	  this	  more	  recent	  research	  has	  challenged	  stereotypical	  assertions	  and	  suggested	  that	  the	  connection	  
between	  immigration	  and	  crime	  is	  more	  myth	  than	  reality:	  immigrants	  are	  not	  more	  “crime-­‐prone”	  than	  
native-­‐born	  Americans,	  and,	  on	  balance,	  immigration	  does	  not	  increase	  neighborhood	  crime	  rates	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(Butcher	  and	  Piehl	  1998).	  In	  fact,	  emerging	  evidence	  indicates	  that	  immigration	  may	  improve	  
neighborhood	  conditions	  and	  reduce	  levels	  of	  crime.	  	  
Nonetheless,	  research	  on	  the	  immigration-­‐crime	  nexus	  continues	  to	  be	  a	  work-­‐in-­‐progress,	  and	  
a	  number	  of	  important	  issues	  remain.	  Among	  the	  most	  important	  of	  these	  concerns	  the	  disaggregation	  
of	  immigration.	  As	  noted	  above,	  total	  immigration	  does	  not	  appear	  to	  promote	  higher	  crime	  rates.	  But	  
this	  population	  is	  hardly	  homogeneous.	  Immigrants	  are	  drawn	  from	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  diverse	  countries,	  
cultures	  and	  racial	  and	  ethnic	  groups.	  Nowhere	  is	  this	  more	  evident	  than	  in	  New	  York	  City	  (Kasinitz,	  
Mollenkopf,	  and	  Waters	  2009).	  For	  this	  reason,	  this	  study	  examines	  patterns	  of	  crime	  among	  racial	  and	  
ethnic	  subgroups	  in	  New	  York,	  and	  the	  effects	  of	  New	  York’s	  Order	  Maintenance	  Policing	  strategy	  
(Fagan,	  Geller,	  Davies,	  and	  West	  2010;	  Zimring	  2011)	  in	  immigrant	  neighborhoods.	  	  
	  
Perspectives	  on	  Immigration,	  Crime,	  and	  Enforcement	  
	   As	  in	  the	  past,	  the	  spectre	  of	  elevated	  crime	  rates	  among	  immigrants	  has	  animated	  or	  
reinforced	  specific	  law	  enforcement	  tactics	  that	  seek	  to	  counter	  unique	  forms	  of	  criminal	  activity	  or	  
organizations	  among	  immigrants	  (Rumbaut	  and	  Ewing	  2007).	  Programs	  such	  as	  the	  federal	  Secure	  
Communities	  Program	  (United	  States	  Customs	  and	  Immigration	  Enforcement	  Agency	  (USCIEA)	  2009;	  
Homeland	  Security	  Advisory	  Council	  2011)	  up	  the	  ante	  in	  this	  debate	  by	  attempting	  to	  establish	  a	  link	  
between	  “ordinary”	  crime,	  immigration	  violations,	  and	  national	  security	  threats	  (Hagan,	  Levi,	  and	  
Dinovitzer	  2008;	  Varsanyi,	  Lewis,	  Provine,	  and	  Decker	  forthcoming;	  Sklansky	  forthcoming).	  	  Some	  gang	  
violence	  suppression	  initiatives	  also	  focus	  on	  the	  nexus	  of	  immigration	  and	  street	  gangs,	  and	  these	  links	  
become	  even	  more	  contentious	  when	  immigration	  is	  linked	  to	  violence	  from	  drug	  trafficking	  (Stuntz	  
2002),	  as	  in	  the	  Krentz	  case.	  	  	  
	   These	  efforts	  are	  predicated	  on	  assumptions	  that	  immigrants	  commit	  more	  crimes,	  and	  that	  
urban	  neighborhoods	  of	  immigrant	  concentration	  are	  important	  targets	  for	  enhanced	  law	  enforcement.	  
Whether	  immigration	  contributes	  to	  or	  attenuates	  neighborhood	  crime	  rates	  is	  a	  contentious	  debate	  
(see,	  e.g.,	  Butcher	  and	  Piehl	  1998;	  2007).	  	  	  The	  sociological	  and	  criminological	  literature	  offers	  grounds	  
both	  to	  support	  and	  reject	  these	  claims.	  	  Below	  we	  briefly	  sketch	  out	  the	  evidence	  on	  these	  competing	  
perspectives	  on	  the	  effects	  of	  immigration,	  and	  follow	  that	  with	  empirical	  tests	  from	  New	  York	  City,	  a	  
place	  that	  has	  been	  an	  important	  immigration	  reception	  context	  throughout	  the	  history	  of	  the	  U.S.	  
(Kasinitz,	  Mollenkopf,	  and	  Waters	  2009;	  Portes	  and	  Rumbaut	  2006).	  	  
The	  Bad:	  Why	  might	  immigration	  increase	  neighborhood	  crime	  rates?	  
The	  presumptive	  association	  between	  immigration	  and	  crime	  does	  not	  only	  reflect	  simple	  
nativism	  and	  prejudice.	  Immigration	  was,	  from	  the	  start,	  built	  into	  theories	  of	  crime	  in	  neighborhoods.	  
Social	  disorganization	  theory	  was	  formulated	  by	  Shaw	  and	  McKay	  (1943)	  in	  response	  to	  the	  disruptions	  
fostered	  by	  successive	  waves	  of	  immigration	  into	  Chicago.	  It	  was,	  in	  other	  words,	  largely	  a	  theory	  about	  
the	  effects	  of	  immigration	  and	  political	  economy,	  and	  the	  basic	  argument	  linking	  immigration	  with	  crime	  
have	  endured	  even	  as	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  debate	  changed	  (Bursik	  and	  Grasmick	  1993).	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For	  example,	  the	  key	  construct	  linking	  social	  disorganization	  and	  crime	  is	  informal	  social	  control	  
(or	  lack	  thereof).	  Neighborhoods	  can	  accomplish	  collective	  goals,	  including	  crime	  control,	  through	  
mechanisms	  of	  informal	  social	  control,	  such	  as	  local	  institutions,	  social	  networks,	  and	  shared	  
expectations	  regarding	  behavioral	  regulation	  (Sampson,	  Raudenbush,	  and	  Earls	  1997).	  	  One	  version	  of	  
the	  immigration	  link	  to	  crime	  focuses	  on	  the	  compromising	  effects	  of	  immigrant	  concentration	  on	  local	  
efforts	  at	  informal	  social	  control.	  Often	  arriving	  with	  few	  financial	  resources	  and	  limited	  job	  prospects,	  
immigrants	  tend	  to	  be	  sorted	  or	  self-­‐selected	  into	  already	  disadvantaged	  areas	  (Sampson	  2008).	  
Immigrants	  have	  little	  attachment	  to	  these	  neighborhoods	  upon	  their	  arrival,	  and	  leave	  for	  better	  social	  
and	  material	  conditions	  as	  soon	  as	  possible,	  only	  to	  be	  succeeded	  by	  other	  immigrant	  groups	  (Shaw	  and	  
McKay	  1943).	  The	  population	  turnover	  caused	  by	  the	  influx	  and	  outflow	  of	  immigrants	  destabilizes	  these	  
areas.	  The	  resulting	  racial	  and	  ethnic	  heterogeneity	  hampers	  interpersonal	  communication,	  renders	  
trust	  more	  elusive	  and,	  at	  the	  extremes,	  leads	  to	  territorial	  conflict	  and	  ethnic	  rivalry.	  In	  short,	  the	  rapid	  
social	  change	  brought	  on	  by	  widespread	  immigration	  serves	  to	  undermine	  local	  institutions	  and	  
networks	  and	  weakens	  the	  foundations	  of	  informal	  social	  control.	  	  
The	  demographics	  of	  immigration	  may	  also	  increase	  crime	  rates,	  net	  of	  any	  individual	  criminal	  
tendencies	  of	  newly	  arrived	  immigrants	  or	  their	  second	  generation	  children.	  In	  general	  though	  hardly	  
uniformly,	  immigrants	  tend	  to	  be	  young,	  male,	  relatively	  poor,	  and	  uneducated	  (Portes	  and	  Rumbaut	  
2006).	  In	  other	  words,	  immigrants	  tend	  to	  share	  a	  demographic	  profile	  consistent	  with	  groups	  that	  
already	  commit	  a	  disproportionate	  share	  of	  crime.	  So,	  immigration	  may	  increase	  crime	  levels	  simply	  by	  
increasing	  the	  pool	  of	  more	  likely	  offenders.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  immigration	  may	  also	  elevate	  crime	  by	  
reinforcing	  existing	  disadvantage	  in	  high-­‐risk	  neighborhoods.	  With	  low	  incomes	  and	  limited	  skills,	  
immigrant	  populations	  can	  sustain	  the	  lower	  socioeconomic	  status	  of	  these	  areas.	  Over	  time,	  this	  status	  
may	  become	  entrenched.	  In	  extreme	  circumstances,	  neighborhoods	  may	  reach	  a	  tipping	  point,	  with	  
spiralling	  levels	  of	  crime	  and	  violence.	  
Opportunity	  structures	  may	  also	  be	  implicated	  in	  immigrant	  crime	  patterns.	  Often	  residing	  in	  
distressed	  neighborhoods	  and	  lacking	  job	  skills,	  connections,	  and	  social	  capital,	  immigrants	  are	  
confronted	  by	  blocked	  economic	  opportunities.	  One	  potential	  response	  to	  attenuated	  access	  to	  capital	  
and	  legal	  markets	  is	  for	  immigrants	  to	  “innovate”	  (Merton,	  1938)	  by	  resorting	  to	  crime	  as	  an	  alternative	  
avenue	  for	  advancement.	  The	  probability	  of	  innovative	  crime	  is	  enhanced	  by	  greater	  access	  to	  
illegitimate	  opportunity	  structures,	  which	  are	  more	  prevalent	  in	  disadvantaged	  areas	  (Cloward	  and	  
Ohlin,	  1960).	  	  
Finally,	  immigration	  may	  increase	  crime	  not	  as	  offenders,	  but	  as	  victims.	  Immigrant	  populations	  
are	  at	  greater	  risk	  of	  victimization	  for	  several	  reasons.	  Immigrants	  tend	  to	  reside,	  at	  least	  initially,	  in	  
high-­‐crime	  areas.	  Alba,	  Logan,	  and	  Bellair	  (1994)	  found	  that	  Hispanics	  who	  were	  born	  outside	  the	  U.S.,	  
had	  immigrated	  only	  recently,	  or	  were	  less	  linguistically	  assimilated,	  lived	  in	  areas	  with	  higher	  crime	  
rates	  than	  did	  other	  groups.	  Increasingly,	  research	  has	  paid	  particular	  attention	  to	  particular	  types	  of	  
immigrant	  victimization,	  such	  as	  hate	  crimes	  (Hendricks,	  Ortiz,	  Sugie,	  and	  Miller	  2007)	  and	  sexual	  
violence	  against	  women	  (Decker,	  Raj,	  and	  Silverman	  2007).	  But	  immigrants	  are	  also	  vulnerable	  to	  a	  wide	  
range	  of	  exploitations,	  including	  unscrupulous	  landlords,	  bankers,	  financiers,	  and	  employers	  (Chiswick	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and	  Miller	  2008).	  Language	  barriers	  and	  cultural	  mistrust	  of	  the	  police	  may	  make	  immigrants	  reluctant	  
to	  report	  crime	  and	  otherwise	  interact	  with	  authorities,	  making	  immigrants	  more	  open	  to	  predation.	  	  
The	  Good:	  Why	  might	  immigration	  reduce	  crime?	  
Running	  through	  the	  traditional	  theoretical	  perspectives	  are	  a	  series	  of	  assumptions	  about	  the	  
process	  of	  immigration	  (see,	  e.g.,	  Lewis,	  1966;	  Portes	  and	  Sensenbrenner	  1993).	  The	  simplistic	  image	  of	  
socially	  isolated	  immigrants	  with	  little	  education	  and	  limited	  employment	  potential	  being	  funnelled	  into	  
the	  disadvantaged	  neighborhoods	  is	  becoming	  anachronistic.	  The	  post-­‐1965	  wave	  of	  immigration	  has	  
been	  marked	  by	  greater	  diversity	  in	  education,	  job	  skills,	  and	  access	  to	  employment	  networks	  
(Wadsworth	  2010).	  These	  changes	  to	  immigrants’	  profiles	  have	  forced	  a	  reconceptualization	  of	  the	  
connection	  between	  immigration	  and	  crime.	  Rather	  than	  serving	  to	  increase	  crime	  rates,	  there	  are	  a	  
number	  of	  ways	  in	  which	  immigration	  might	  instead	  be	  a	  protective	  factor	  that	  reduces	  crime.	  
One	  reason	  that	  immigration	  might	  mitigate	  crime	  is	  what	  Wadsworth	  (2010)	  has	  referred	  to	  as	  
the	  “healthy	  immigrant	  thesis.”	  Immigration	  is	  not	  a	  random	  process,	  and	  immigrants	  do	  not	  represent	  a	  
random	  sample	  from	  their	  countries	  of	  origin.	  They	  are	  among	  the	  most	  highly	  motivated	  individuals,	  
with	  the	  lowest	  propensities	  toward	  criminal	  behavior.	  After	  immigrants	  have	  arrived,	  they	  have	  greater	  
stakes	  in	  conformity	  and	  are	  much	  less	  likely	  to	  jeopardize	  their	  achievements	  by	  participating	  in	  crime.	  
It	  is	  also	  possible	  that	  immigrants	  have	  different	  frameworks	  for	  evaluating	  their	  neighborhood	  
environments	  and	  work	  conditions.	  The	  “disadvantaged”	  neighborhoods	  and	  “low	  skilled”	  jobs	  
immigrants	  might	  encounter	  in	  the	  US	  are	  still	  improvements	  compared	  to	  conditions	  in	  their	  countries	  
of	  origins.	  	  	  
Similarly,	  there	  may	  be	  aspects	  of	  culture	  that	  serve	  to	  protect	  immigrants	  from	  crime.	  
Immigrant	  communities	  foster	  closer	  social	  ties	  and	  networks,	  provide	  social	  support,	  promote	  cultural	  
preservation,	  and	  aid	  in	  the	  maintenance	  of	  traditional	  norms	  and	  values.	  It	  has	  been	  suggested	  that	  
immigrants	  may	  place	  greater	  emphasis	  on	  marriage	  and	  intact	  families	  (Ousey	  and	  Kurbrin	  2009).	  More	  
recent	  immigrants	  also	  benefit	  from	  the	  existing	  co-­‐ethnic	  networks,	  enclaves	  that	  can	  provide	  
assistance	  as	  immigrants	  navigate	  the	  new	  circumstances.	  The	  growth	  and	  concentration	  of	  ethnic	  
enclaves	  may	  also	  offer	  economic	  opportunities	  that	  were	  previously	  unavailable	  to	  immigrants.	  
Ethnically-­‐organized	  or	  segmented	  economies	  often	  provide	  jobs	  in	  businesses	  establish	  by	  earlier	  
immigrants	  (Portes	  and	  Zhou	  1992),	  affording	  opportunities	  perhaps	  inaccessible	  in	  the	  broader	  labor	  
market.	  Niche	  employment	  may	  also	  improve	  the	  prospects	  of	  some	  immigrants	  that	  might	  otherwise	  
find	  it	  difficult	  to	  find	  work	  (Kasinitz,	  Mollenkopf,	  and	  Waters	  2009).	  Some	  groups	  may	  be	  particularly	  
entrepreneurial.	  
At	  the	  same	  time,	  widespread	  immigration	  can	  provide	  advantages	  that	  extend	  beyond	  the	  
confines	  of	  enclaves,	  by	  repopulating	  moribund	  neighborhoods,	  rejuvenating	  local	  economies,	  and	  
encouraging	  local	  development.	  More	  generally,	  the	  potential	  boon	  of	  immigration	  is	  captured	  by	  the	  
“immigrant	  revitalization”	  perspective.	  Martinez	  (2006)	  has	  posited	  that	  the	  influx	  of	  immigrants	  fosters	  
“new	  forms	  of	  social	  organization	  and	  adaptive	  social	  structures”	  which	  may	  mediate	  the	  deleterious	  
consequences	  of	  residing	  in	  disadvantaged	  areas.	  In	  addition	  to	  reinvigorating	  economies	  and	  nurturing	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familial	  ties	  and	  social	  networks,	  large	  scale	  immigration	  can	  expand	  and	  strengthen	  community	  
institutions	  (Velez	  2009).	  Immigrant	  revitalization	  does	  not	  represent	  a	  complete	  rebuttal	  of	  social	  
disorganization,	  but	  rather,	  suggests	  that	  in	  some	  circumstances,	  instability	  is	  decoupled	  from	  the	  
inhibition	  of	  social	  control,	  and	  thus	  does	  not	  necessarily	  function	  as	  a	  precursor	  to	  crime	  (Martinez,	  
Stowell,	  and	  Lee	  2010).	  	  
The	  evidence	  thus	  far	  
Although	  immigration	  and	  crime	  have	  long	  been	  conflated,	  both	  on	  theoretical	  grounds	  and	  in	  
the	  popular	  imagination,	  there	  is	  strikingly	  little	  evidence	  to	  support	  this	  nexus.	  There	  is	  smattering	  of	  
supporting	  examples	  (see,	  e.g.,	  Taft	  1933;	  Hagan	  and	  Palloni	  1988),	  but	  these	  analyses	  are	  more	  
anecdotal	  than	  systematic.	  Most	  early	  research	  on	  immigration	  and	  crime	  is	  beset	  with	  methodological	  
shortcomings	  (Tonry	  1997).	  In	  a	  detailed	  review	  of	  more	  contemporary	  aggregate-­‐level	  studies,	  Ousey	  
and	  Kubrin	  (2009)	  found	  that	  the	  supposition	  that	  immigration	  contributes	  to	  crime	  rates	  was	  
unwarranted.	  With	  few	  exceptions,	  immigration	  was	  either	  a)	  was	  not	  associated	  with	  measures	  of	  
crime	  and	  violence;	  or	  b)	  actually	  reduced	  violent	  levels.	  
These	  “neutral”	  or	  “protective”	  effects	  of	  immigration	  have	  been	  shown	  across	  a	  number	  of	  
research	  setting	  and	  levels	  (see,	  Sampson	  2008,	  for	  a	  review).	  For	  example,	  Butcher	  and	  Piehl	  (1998)	  
concluded	  that,	  after	  controlling	  for	  demographic	  characteristics,	  immigration	  had	  no	  effect	  on	  either	  
crime	  rates	  or	  changes	  in	  crime	  rates	  in	  a	  sample	  of	  43	  metropolitan	  areas.	  Analogous	  results	  were	  
presented	  by	  Martinez	  (2000)	  in	  a	  study	  of	  111	  cities	  with	  at	  least	  5,000	  Latinos.	  Immigration	  was	  
positively	  associated	  with	  total	  homicide	  rate	  and	  negatively	  associated	  with	  Latino	  homicide	  rates,	  but	  
neither	  relationship	  was	  significant.	  Using	  a	  random	  sample	  of	  150	  Metropolitan	  Statistical	  Areas	  and	  
Primary	  Metropolitan	  Statistical	  Areas	  (MSAs	  and	  PMSAs),	  Reid,	  Weiss,	  Adelman,	  and	  Jaret	  (2005)	  found	  
recent	  immigration	  had	  a	  significant	  negative	  effect	  on	  homicide	  rates,	  but	  otherwise	  showed	  no	  effect	  
for	  robbery,	  burglary,	  or	  larceny	  rates.	  In	  a	  longitudinal	  study	  of	  159	  cities	  between	  1980	  and	  2000,	  
immigration	  had	  a	  mildly	  significant	  negative	  influence	  on	  violent	  crime	  rates	  (Ousey	  and	  Kubrin,	  2009).	  	  
Cities	  are	  an	  important	  unit	  of	  macro-­‐level	  analysis,	  but	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  their	  size	  masks	  
important	  variation	  between	  neighborhoods.	  A	  series	  of	  census	  tract-­‐level	  studies	  by	  Martinez	  and	  
colleagues	  have	  generally	  confirmed	  the	  results	  from	  the	  cities.	  For	  example,	  recent	  immigration	  did	  not	  
affect	  Latino	  homicide	  rates	  in	  Miami	  or	  San	  Diego	  neighborhoods,	  nor	  Black	  homicide	  rates	  in	  El	  Paso	  
(Lee,	  Martinez,	  and	  Rosenfeld	  2001).	  Recent	  immigration	  was	  negatively,	  and	  significantly,	  related	  to	  
Latino	  homicide	  in	  El	  Paso	  and	  Black	  homicide	  in	  Miami.	  Only	  for	  Black	  homicide	  rates	  in	  San	  Diego	  was	  
immigration	  a	  significant	  positive	  predictor.	  Similar	  results	  were	  produced	  when	  homicide	  was	  
disaggregated	  by	  motivational	  types	  (Nielsen,	  Lee,	  and	  Martinez	  2005).	  When	  more	  nuanced	  measures	  
of	  immigration	  are	  used,	  ethnic-­‐specific	  models	  showed	  no	  association	  between	  immigration	  and	  violent	  
crime	  rates	  in	  Houston	  and	  mostly	  significant	  negative	  effects	  for	  San	  Diego	  (Stowell	  and	  Martinez	  2007;	  
2009).	  Finally,	  a	  longitudinal	  study	  of	  San	  Diego	  neighborhoods	  between	  1980	  and	  2000	  	  neighborhoods	  
with	  higher	  proportions	  of	  immigrants	  had	  lower	  levels	  of	  total,	  Latino,	  and	  non-­‐Latino	  white	  
victimization	  (Martinez,	  Stowell,	  and	  Lee	  2010).	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Taken	  together	  these	  studies,	  utilizing	  a	  variety	  of	  crime	  types,	  measures	  of	  immigration,	  
research	  designs,	  and	  units	  of	  analysis,	  offer	  a	  preponderance	  of	  evidence	  demonstrating	  that	  
“immigration	  reduces	  crime.”	  Lee	  and	  Martinez	  (2009)	  have	  characterized	  this	  proposal	  as	  an	  “emerging	  
scholarly	  consensus,”	  and	  several	  authors	  have	  begun	  to	  explain	  the	  precipitous	  crime	  decline	  of	  the	  90s	  
as	  a	  function	  of	  rising	  immigration	  (Sampson	  2008;	  MacDonald,	  Hipp,	  and	  Gill	  2008;	  Stowell,	  Messner,	  
McGeever,	  and	  Raffalovich	  2009;	  Wadsworth	  2010).	  At	  a	  minimum,	  the	  findings	  of	  contemporary	  
research	  call	  into	  question	  previous	  theoretical	  perspectives	  supposing	  a	  positive	  correlation	  between	  
immigration	  and	  crime.	  Nonetheless,	  research	  on	  the	  immigration-­‐crime	  nexus	  continues	  to	  be	  a	  work-­‐
in-­‐progress,	  and	  a	  number	  of	  important	  issues	  remain.	  One	  such	  issue	  concerns	  the	  disaggregation	  of	  
racial	  and	  ethnic	  effects.	  Much	  of	  the	  current	  wave	  of	  research	  has	  focused	  on	  Latino	  immigrants.	  Few	  if	  
any	  studies	  have	  extended	  their	  comparisons	  to	  include	  African,	  West	  Indian,	  and	  Asian	  populations.	  
The	  present	  study	  analyzes	  criminogenic	  effects	  across	  this	  wider	  spectrum	  of	  groups.	  
Enforcement	  
Interest	  in	  the	  overlap	  of	  policing	  and	  immigration	  has	  been	  expressed	  on	  a	  number	  of	  fronts	  
(Stuntz	  2002;	  Hagan,	  Levi,	  and	  Dinovitzer	  2008;	  Sklansky	  forthcoming;	  Epp,	  Maynard-­‐Moody,	  and	  
Heider-­‐Markel	  forthcoming).	  At	  present,	  special	  attention	  is	  being	  paid	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  illegal	  
immigration,	  the	  security	  of	  U.S.	  borders,	  and	  the	  broader	  “war	  on	  terrorism”.	  Once	  a	  primarily	  federal	  
issue,	  these	  concerns	  have	  are	  increasingly	  playing	  out	  on	  more	  local	  stages	  (Harris	  2006).	  September	  
11,	  2001	  led	  to	  a	  sea	  change,	  as	  the	  Department	  of	  Justice	  began	  utilizing	  local	  police	  to	  supplement	  
immigration	  enforcement	  (Gladstein	  2005),	  blurring	  the	  lines	  between	  immigration	  offenses	  under	  
federal	  law	  and	  criminal	  offenses	  under	  state	  statutes.	  This,	  in	  turn,	  has	  altered	  substantially	  and	  
problematized	  the	  relationship	  between	  immigrant	  communities	  and	  local	  agencies.	  Most	  notably,	  the	  
shift	  in	  emphasis	  has	  proved	  difficult	  to	  reconcile	  with	  the	  dictates	  of	  “community	  policing”	  (Tyler,	  
Schulhopfer,	  and	  Huq	  2010).	  Tyler	  and	  colleagues	  show,	  in	  a	  survey	  of	  Muslim	  Americans	  in	  New	  York	  
City,	  that	  the	  trust	  and	  legitimacy	  required	  for	  effective	  community	  policing	  is	  elusive	  when	  many	  
residents	  fear	  that	  contact	  with	  the	  police	  could	  lead	  to	  deportation.	  	  In	  fact,	  the	  degradation	  of	  police-­‐
community	  relations	  has	  been	  most	  acute	  in	  immigrant	  communities	  (Jones	  and	  Supinski	  2010).	  
A	  second	  line	  of	  inquiry	  has	  involved	  an	  expansion	  of	  the	  literature	  on	  public	  perceptions	  of	  the	  
police	  to	  include	  immigrant	  populations.	  Race	  and	  ethnicity	  have	  long	  been	  central	  to	  understanding	  
disparate	  levels	  of	  support	  for	  and	  satisfaction	  with	  the	  police,	  but	  only	  recently	  has	  immigrant	  status	  
been	  incorporated	  into	  this	  literature.	  Some	  of	  the	  findings	  regarding	  immigrant	  attitudes	  are	  consistent	  
with	  previous	  opinion	  surveys.	  For	  example,	  quantity	  of	  police	  contacts	  was	  negatively	  related	  to	  rating	  
of	  the	  police	  for	  Chinese	  immigrants	  in	  NYC,	  while	  quality	  of	  interaction	  was	  a	  key	  determinant	  of	  
satisfaction	  with	  the	  police	  (Chu,	  Song,	  and	  Dombrink,	  2005).	  However,	  evaluations	  of	  the	  police	  may	  
also	  reflect	  considerations	  unique	  to	  immigrants,	  such	  as	  their	  former	  experiences	  with	  and	  perceptions	  
of	  the	  criminal	  justice	  systems	  of	  the	  countries	  from	  which	  they	  emigrated	  (Davis	  and	  Miller,	  2002).	  The	  
specific	  information	  about	  the	  police	  conveyed	  through	  social	  networks	  of	  family,	  friends,	  
acquaintances,	  neighbors,	  and	  co-­‐workers	  similarly	  plays	  a	  pivotal	  role	  in	  the	  development	  of	  
sentiments	  towards	  the	  police	  (Menjivar	  and	  Bejarano	  2004).	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As	  the	  scale	  of	  immigration	  has	  grown,	  the	  challenges	  inherent	  in	  policing	  immigrants	  and	  
immigrant	  communities	  have	  also	  begun	  to	  garner	  more	  consideration.	  Perhaps	  the	  most	  prominent	  
obstacle	  confronting	  police-­‐immigrant	  relations	  is	  language.	  The	  inability	  to	  communication	  effectively	  
and	  efficiently	  is	  a	  source	  of	  considerable	  delay	  and	  frustration	  for	  officers.	  Moreover,	  many	  immigrants	  
arrive	  from	  countries	  where	  violence,	  corruption,	  and	  incompetence	  are	  endemic	  to	  the	  police	  (Mears	  
2001;	  Skogan	  2009).	  The	  fear	  of	  the	  police	  that	  may	  be	  imported	  from	  these	  originating	  countries	  can	  
pose	  another	  significant	  barrier	  to	  communication.	  As	  well,	  newcomers	  often	  lack	  knowledge	  pertaining	  
to	  the	  criminal	  justice	  system,	  which	  complicates	  relationship-­‐building	  with	  the	  police.	  In	  certain	  
circumstances,	  the	  specific	  nature	  of	  police-­‐immigrant	  contacts	  may	  be	  a	  point	  of	  contention.	  Culver	  
(2004)	  noted	  that	  the	  sizable	  number	  of	  interactions	  involving	  traffic	  and	  false	  identification	  offenses	  in	  
one	  small	  Midwestern	  community	  resulted	  in	  disproportionately	  negative	  contacts	  between	  the	  police	  
and	  Hispanic	  community.	  	  
Law	  enforcement	  has	  always	  been	  an	  important	  corollary	  to	  crime,	  but	  the	  correlation	  between	  
the	  two	  has	  never	  been	  perfect.	  There	  are	  host	  of	  factors	  that	  can	  influence	  patterns	  of	  enforcement	  
independent	  of	  crime.	  Of	  particular	  interest	  here	  are	  the	  contextual	  effects	  of	  neighborhoods	  on	  
policing.	  In	  contrast	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  crime,	  the	  contingent	  relationship	  with	  law	  enforcement	  continues	  to	  
be	  largely	  absent	  from	  the	  criminological	  treatment	  of	  immigration.	  To	  be	  more	  precise,	  the	  aggregate-­‐
level	  impact	  of	  immigration	  levels	  on	  rates	  of	  enforcement	  has	  not,	  as	  yet,	  received	  sufficient	  attention.	  
This	  research	  is	  a	  first	  step	  in	  try	  to	  understand	  patterns	  of	  enforcement	  in	  immigrant	  neighborhoods.	  
Research	  Questions	  
As	  the	  quintessential	  “gateway”	  city,	  New	  York	  City	  provides	  a	  crucial	  platform	  for	  exploring	  the	  
effects	  of	  immigration	  on	  local	  crime	  and	  enforcement.	  The	  sheer	  scale	  and	  variety	  of	  immigration	  in	  
NYC	  allows	  for	  analyses	  to	  be	  disaggregated	  by	  racial/ethnic	  groups.	  The	  rich	  immigrant	  history	  
facilitates	  a	  number	  of	  conceptually	  important	  comparisons,	  including	  those	  involving	  “newer”	  
immigrants	  and	  native	  co-­‐ethnics.	  And	  as	  with	  other	  large	  U.S.	  cities,	  patterns	  of	  immigration,	  crime,	  
and	  enforcement	  continue	  to	  evolve.	  The	  period	  of	  time	  under	  consideration	  here,	  from	  1990	  to	  2000,	  
saw	  a	  notable	  increase	  in	  the	  diversity	  of	  New	  York’s	  immigrant	  population.	  In	  light	  of	  these	  ongoing	  
changes,	  this	  study	  updates	  and	  reconsiders	  a	  series	  of	  questions	  relating	  to	  NYC	  neighborhoods.	  
First,	  where	  do	  immigrants	  settle	  in	  NYC?	  The	  choice	  of	  residential	  locations	  is	  not	  random.	  
Rather,	  immigrants	  self-­‐select	  into	  neighborhoods.	  Immigrants	  have	  traditionally	  settled	  in	  
disadvantaged	  areas	  characterized	  by	  high	  levels	  of	  poverty,	  racial	  heterogeneity,	  mobility,	  and	  crime.	  If	  
settlement	  patterns	  have	  changed,	  past	  theoretical	  explanations	  of	  immigration	  and	  crime	  need	  to	  be	  
revisited.	  	  This	  study	  investigates	  the	  social,	  economic,	  and	  crime	  conditions	  that	  affect	  the	  self-­‐selection	  
process	  for	  immigrants.	  The	  non-­‐random	  nature	  of	  residential	  location	  has	  an	  important	  methodological	  
dimension	  as	  well.	  Criminological	  evaluations	  have	  not	  sufficiently	  addressed	  the	  potential	  for	  selection	  
bias	  resulting	  from	  self-­‐selection.	  That	  is,	  prior	  work	  has	  not	  accounted	  for	  the	  propensity	  of	  newly	  
arriving	  groups	  to	  select	  specific	  areas	  for	  settlement	  where	  people	  look	  like	  them	  and	  have	  similar	  
resources.	  This	  study	  uses	  a	  generalized	  propensity	  score	  (GPS)	  approach	  to	  control	  for	  selection	  bias	  in	  
the	  analysis	  of	  immigration	  and	  crime.	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Second,	  do	  local	  crime	  rates	  vary	  by	  level	  of	  immigration?	  Most	  current	  research	  indicates	  that	  
immigration	  either	  is	  unrelated	  to,	  or	  mitigates,	  neighborhood	  crime.	  This	  study	  utilizes	  a	  larger	  number	  
of	  more	  diverse	  neighbrohoods,	  and	  a	  wider	  variety	  of	  crimes,	  than	  have	  previous	  efforts.	  In	  addition	  to	  
assessing	  the	  broad	  effects	  of	  immigration	  on	  crime,	  this	  study	  also	  examines	  whether	  local	  crime	  rates	  
vary	  by	  race-­‐	  and	  ethnic-­‐specific	  immigrant	  groups.	  
Third,	  is	  there	  a	  relationship	  between	  immigration	  and	  patterns	  of	  police	  enforcement?	  Prior	  
research	  has	  not	  examined	  how	  immigration	  may	  influence	  neighborhood	  patterns	  of	  enforcement	  of	  
“regular”	  crime.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  evaluate	  enforcement	  in	  addition	  to	  crime,	  given	  what	  is	  known	  about	  
the	  complex	  dynamics	  of	  policing	  in	  relation	  to	  neighborhood	  and	  race	  more	  generally.	  Finally,	  as	  with	  
crime,	  this	  study	  also	  disaggregates	  effects	  by	  various	  immigrant	  groups.	  
	  
Methods	  
	   The	  concentration	  of	  foreign	  born	  population	  is	  used	  to	  estimate	  the	  effects	  of	  immigration	  on	  
crime	  and	  enforcement	  in	  New	  York	  City	  neighborhoods	  from	  2004	  to	  2008.	  We	  begin	  by	  estimating	  the	  
selection	  of	  immigrants	  into	  a	  neighborhood	  by	  adjusting	  immigration	  rates	  by	  their	  correlation	  with	  
observed	  characteristics	  of	  the	  neighborhoods	  including	  social	  structure,	  political	  economy,	  and	  crime.	  	  
We	  estimate	  the	  selection	  of	  immigrant	  groups	  into	  neighborhoods	  for	  four	  racial	  and	  ethnic	  groups,	  
and	  also	  for	  specific	  varieties	  of	  crime	  and	  enforcement.	  We	  use	  Generalized	  Propensity	  Score	  (GPS)	  
analysis	  (Hirano	  and	  Imbens	  2004;	  Feng,	  Zhou,	  Zou,	  Fan,	  and	  Li	  2011)	  to	  estimate	  the	  probability	  (p)	  of	  a	  
proportion	  of	  immigrants	  residing	  in	  a	  neighborhood	  conditional	  on	  the	  observed	  characteristics	  of	  each	  
neighborhood.	  Like	  the	  standard	  propensity	  score	  approach,	  GPS	  aims	  to	  establish	  the	  effect	  of	  a	  
“treatment”	  (in	  this	  case	  level	  of	  immigration)	  with	  observational	  data	  where	  the	  treatment	  is	  not	  
randomly	  assigned.	  But	  while	  propensity	  scores	  attempt	  to	  control	  for	  differences	  between	  treatment	  
groups	  when	  the	  treatment	  is	  binary,	  GPS	  allows	  for	  continuous	  treatments	  (Imai	  and	  van	  Dyk	  2004).	  
The	  GPS	  approach	  begins	  by	  estimating	  a	  propensity	  score	  (the	  variables	  used	  to	  model	  immigration	  are	  
illustrated	  in	  Table	  1).	  GPS	  assumes	  that	  the	  disturbances	  for	  the	  estimation	  model	  are	  normally	  
distributed	  and	  tests	  this	  assumption	  using	  the	  Kolmogorov-­‐Smirnov	  equality-­‐of-­‐distributions	  test.	  
Finally,	  the	  balance	  on	  the	  covariates	  is	  evaluated	  at	  specified	  intervals	  of	  the	  treatment	  variable	  (Bia	  
and	  Mattei	  2008).	  	  
	  
Once	  the	  normality	  of	  disturbances	  and	  balancing	  properties	  have	  been	  confirmed,	  the	  
generalized	  propensity	  score	  is	  used	  to	  identify	  the	  effects	  of	  immigration	  on	  crime	  and	  enforcement	  
using	  a	  dose-­‐response	  model.	  The	  dose-­‐response	  model	  takes	  the	  form	  of	  a	  regression	  equation	  
	  
Y	  =	  T	  +	  GPS	  
where:	  
Y	  =	  Outcome	  
T	  =	  Treatment	  
GPS	  =	  Generalized	  propensity	  score	  
	  
That	  is,	  the	  dose-­‐response	  models	  estimate	  the	  marginal	  effects	  of	  increases	  in	  the	  levels	  of	  
concentration	  of	  immigrants	  in	  a	  neighborhood	  (the	  “treatment”)	  on	  the	  outcomes	  of	  interest.	  	  Similar	  
to	  the	  use	  of	  propensity	  scores	  to	  estimate	  the	  non-­‐random	  selection	  of	  individuals	  into	  neighborhoods	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(MacDonald,	  this	  volume),	  this	  technique	  allows	  us	  to	  include	  both	  immigrant	  concentration	  and	  the	  
control	  variables	  in	  models	  of	  both	  crime	  and	  enforcement.	  	  This	  estimation	  strategy	  produces	  an	  
unbiased	  test	  of	  the	  effect	  of	  immigrant	  concentration	  on	  crime.	  
	  
Data	  
	   Immigration.	  Immigration	  here	  refers	  to	  foreign	  born	  individuals.	  Immigration	  data	  were	  
obtained	  from	  decennial	  census	  data	  on	  tracts	  in	  New	  York	  City	  in	  2000.	  	  Race-­‐	  and	  ethnic-­‐specific	  data	  
were	  taken	  from	  STF4	  census	  files.	  “Newer”	  immigrants	  are	  those	  individuals	  who	  arrived	  in	  the	  U.S.	  
between	  1995	  and	  2000.	  	  We	  include	  immigrants	  from	  Caribbean	  and	  African	  nations	  among	  “Black”	  
immigrants,	  despite	  potential	  differences	  in	  the	  countries	  of	  origin	  in	  each	  of	  these	  populations.	  	  One	  
reason	  to	  combine	  these	  groups	  is	  the	  potential	  reactivity	  of	  police	  officers	  to	  Afro-­‐centric	  features	  that	  
are	  shared	  among	  this	  population	  as	  well	  as	  native	  born	  African	  Americans	  (Eberhardt,	  Davies,	  Purdie-­‐
Vaughns,	  and	  Johnson	  2006).	  	  We	  also	  include	  Latino	  immigrants	  who	  self-­‐identify	  in	  the	  Census	  as	  both	  
“black”	  and	  “Hispanic	  origin”	  among	  Blacks.	  
	   Neighborhood	  Social	  Structure.	  	  Data	  estimating	  the	  socio-­‐economic	  and	  demographic	  
characteristics	  of	  neighborhood	  were	  obtained	  from	  the	  1990	  and	  2000	  decennial	  census.	  	  	  Housing	  
price	  sale	  data	  were	  obtained	  from	  an	  archive	  of	  real	  estate	  transactions	  maintained	  by	  the	  Department	  
of	  Finance	  in	  New	  York	  City.	  	  Transactions	  were	  recorded	  by	  address	  and	  were	  geocoded	  and	  assigned	  
to	  census	  tracts.	  	  	  
	   Crime.	  	  Homicide	  and	  assault	  rates	  between	  1990	  and	  2000	  were	  computed	  from	  the	  records	  
provided	  by	  the	  New	  York	  City	  Department	  of	  Health	  and	  Mental	  Hygiene.	  	  Homicide	  data	  were	  
obtained	  from	  Vital	  Statistics	  records.	  	  Assault	  data	  were	  obtained	  from	  emergency	  room	  and	  hospital	  
admissions	  for	  intentional	  injuries.	  These	  data	  were	  geocoded	  and	  assigned	  to	  census	  block	  groups	  and	  
tracts.	  	  Detailed	  data	  on	  crime	  incidents	  from	  2004-­‐8	  were	  obtained	  from	  the	  Oniform	  records	  system	  of	  
the	  NYPD,	  which	  is	  the	  method	  for	  compiling	  crime	  complaints.i	  	  Each	  record	  included	  spatial	  
coordinates	  (i.e.,	  latitude	  and	  longitude)	  of	  the	  crime	  location,	  as	  well	  as	  details	  on	  the	  specific	  offense	  
(New	  York	  State	  Penal	  Law	  section).	  	  Crime	  rates	  were	  averaged	  over	  the	  5	  year	  period	  to	  provide	  
stability,	  and	  were	  logged	  to	  minimize	  the	  influence	  of	  outliers.	  
	   Enforcement.	  	  Detailed	  data	  on	  arrests	  were	  obtained	  from	  the	  Online	  Booking	  System	  (OLBS)	  of	  
the	  NYPD.	  	  Records	  include	  both	  offense	  and	  arrest	  location,	  as	  well	  as	  details	  on	  the	  specific	  Penal	  Law	  
section.	  	  
Data	  on	  street	  stops	  were	  also	  obtained	  from	  the	  NYPD	  for	  the	  years	  2004-­‐8.	  	  Records	  include	  
the	  specific	  location	  of	  the	  stop,	  the	  suspected	  crime,	  the	  rationale	  for	  and	  outcome	  of	  the	  stop,	  and	  
demographic	  characteristics	  of	  the	  person	  stopped.	  	  
Arrests	  and	  street	  stops	  were	  combined	  to	  create	  an	  overall	  index	  of	  enforcement.ii	  Rates	  of	  
enforcement	  were	  created	  by	  using	  crimes	  as	  a	  denominator.	  Thus,	  enforcement	  rate	  is	  a	  measure	  of	  
enforcement	  per	  crime.	  Enforcement	  rates	  were	  averaged	  over	  the	  5	  year	  period	  and	  logged.	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Results	  
Where	  Do	  Immigrants	  Settle?	  
Comparisons	  of	  modal	  neighborhood	  characteristics	  for	  each	  race-­‐	  or	  ethnicity-­‐specific	  
population	  group	  are	  shown	  in	  Table	  1.iii	  In	  the	  main,	  each	  group	  tends	  to	  sort	  into	  tracts	  where	  people	  
look	  like	  them	  and	  have	  similar	  resources.	  The	  proclivity	  is	  most	  pronounced	  among	  White	  immigrants,	  
who	  reside	  in	  largely	  White	  (61%)	  neighbhorhoods.	  Black	  immigrants	  similarly	  settle	  in	  predominantly	  
Black	  (55%)	  areas.	  While	  Latino	  immigrants	  also	  live	  where	  Latinos	  comprise	  the	  majority	  of	  residents,	  
the	  distribution	  of	  race/ethnic	  groups	  is	  more	  even.	  Latino	  immigrants	  are	  much	  more	  likely	  than	  Black	  
immigrants	  to	  reside	  near	  Whites	  and	  Asians.	  In	  contrast	  to	  other	  groups,	  Asian	  immigrants	  are	  living	  
not	  in	  Asian	  neighborhoods,	  but	  in	  primarily	  White	  locations.	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  Asian	  immigrants	  have	  
greater	  financial	  resources	  and	  are	  less	  constrained	  in	  terms	  of	  choice	  of	  residential	  neighborhood.	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Black	  immigrants	  tend	  to	  settle	  in	  places	  where	  social	  and	  economic	  disadvantage	  are	  greatest.	  
Relative	  to	  the	  other	  groups,	  modal	  Black	  immigrant	  neighborhoods	  have	  the	  highest	  rates	  of	  poverty,	  
public	  assistance,	  unemployment,	  and	  female	  headed	  households.	  These	  areas	  also	  have	  lower	  access	  to	  
wealth,	  as	  indicated	  by	  housing	  prices.	  A	  similar	  pattern	  is	  found	  in	  relation	  to	  violent	  crime.	  In	  addition	  
socioeconomic	  distress,	  Black	  immigrants	  reside	  in	  areas	  with	  much	  higher	  levels	  of	  homicide	  and	  
assault.	  At	  the	  other	  end	  of	  the	  spectrum,	  White	  and	  Asian	  immigrants	  face	  much	  less	  danger	  in	  their	  
neighborhoods.	  	  Similar	  to	  immigrants	  of	  African	  descent,	  Latino	  immigrants	  also	  tend	  to	  live	  in	  
disadvantaged	  neighborhoods,	  but	  these	  places	  are	  less	  economically	  isolated	  than	  the	  places	  where	  
Black	  immigrants	  settle.	  	  Whites	  tend	  to	  avoid	  socio-­‐economic	  or	  structural	  disadvantage,	  and	  enjoy	  
greater	  access	  to	  wealth	  in	  the	  neighborhoods	  where	  they	  settle.	  Areas	  occupied	  by	  Asian	  immigrants	  
are	  less	  well	  off	  as	  those	  of	  Whites,	  but	  nonetheless	  are	  more	  like	  White	  neighborhoods	  than	  are	  other	  
groups.	  	  
The	  results	  of	  the	  GPS	  models	  confirm	  these	  descriptive	  statistics.	  	  Table	  2	  shows	  the	  factors	  
that	  predict	  the	  concentration	  of	  the	  total	  and	  race/ethnic-­‐specific	  foreign-­‐born	  population	  in	  2000.	  As	  
the	  goal	  of	  the	  propensity	  score	  approach	  is	  to	  improve	  estimates	  of	  immigration	  by	  using	  a	  large	  
number	  of	  relevant	  variables,	  the	  coefficients	  presented	  in	  Table	  2	  should	  be	  interpreted	  cautiously.	  
However,	  the	  results	  nonetheless	  reveal	  some	  interesting	  patterns.	  The	  large	  effect	  for	  immigrant	  
concentration	  at	  the	  outset	  of	  the	  1990-­‐2000	  decade	  is	  not	  surprising,	  and	  suggests	  that	  immigrant	  
neighborhoods	  remain	  stable	  as	  reception	  contexts	  for	  new	  arrivals	  in	  New	  York	  City.	  	  The	  effect	  size	  for	  
the	  1990	  baseline	  dwarfs	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  other	  factors.	  	  Beyond	  the	  stability	  of	  immigrant	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concentration,	  the	  effects	  of	  wealth	  and	  safety	  are	  predictors	  of	  where	  immigrants	  settle.	  	  The	  results	  in	  
Table	  2	  for	  total	  immigration	  reflect	  the	  skew	  toward	  wealth	  or	  less	  disadvantage	  for	  white	  immigrants:	  
immigrant	  concentration	  is	  higher	  in	  neighborhoods	  with	  fewer	  indicia	  of	  disadvantage	  and	  in	  places	  
that	  are	  safer.	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Immigration	  &	  Crime	  
Next,	  GPS	  regressions	  of	  total	  and	  recent	  immigration	  on	  crime	  were	  estimated.	  	  Figure	  1	  shows	  
the	  results	  of	  the	  full	  models,	  which	  include	  controls	  for	  GPS	  score	  for	  immigration	  at	  2000.	  	  Race-­‐	  and	  
ethnic-­‐specific	  immigration	  breakdowns	  are	  presented	  in	  Figure	  2.iv	  	  Immigration	  is	  a	  protective	  factor	  
for	  both	  total	  crime	  and	  three	  specific	  categories	  of	  crime.	  Total	  immigration	  shows	  a	  significant	  (lower	  
than	  -­‐2)	  effect	  for	  all	  crime	  categories.	  The	  preventive	  effects	  of	  immigration	  are	  less	  pronounced	  for	  
recent	  immigrants,	  as	  significant	  negative	  coefficients	  are	  found	  only	  for	  total	  and	  drug	  crime	  rates.	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Immigration	  effects	  vary	  by	  the	  specific	  crime	  and	  racial/ethnic	  group.	  	  Figure	  2	  shows	  that	  
White	  immigration,	  mostly	  from	  Russia	  and	  other	  Eastern	  European	  countries,	  has	  strong	  insulating	  
effects.	  Since	  white	  immigrants	  tend	  to	  settle	  in	  areas	  with	  low	  crime	  rates	  and	  greater	  access	  to	  
economic	  wealth	  and	  resources,	  the	  strong	  negative	  parameter	  suggests	  that	  white	  immigration	  exerts	  
a	  protective	  effect	  beyond	  other	  factors	  that	  also	  reduce	  crime	  risks.	  
	   Total	  and	  violent	  crime	  rates	  are	  lower	  when	  concentrations	  of	  foreign	  born	  persons	  of	  African	  
descent	  are	  higher.	  This	  is	  particularly	  important	  given	  the	  racial	  components	  of	  the	  distribution	  of	  
crime	  across	  NYC	  neighborhoods.	  We	  assume	  that	  these	  are	  largely	  Caribbean	  immigrants,	  although	  
immigration	  from	  the	  African	  continent	  has	  increased	  in	  the	  past	  decade.	  
	   The	  effects	  of	  Latino	  and	  Asian	  immigration	  on	  crime	  are	  more	  modest.	  The	  direction	  of	  the	  
effects	  is	  negative,	  but	  they	  do	  not	  reach	  significance	  in	  any	  of	  the	  models.	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  this	  
attenuated	  influence	  of	  immigration	  reflects	  the	  heterogeneity	  of	  residential	  settlement	  that	  is	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characteristic	  of	  these	  groups.	  Many	  Latino	  immigrants,	  for	  example,	  settle	  in	  diverse	  areas	  of	  the	  City,	  
including	  both	  low	  crime	  places	  (northwest	  Queens)	  and	  high	  crime	  areas	  (Sunset	  Park	  in	  Brooklyn).	  The	  
overall	  average	  effect	  may	  mask	  some	  important	  micro-­‐effects.	  	  	  
	  
Immigration	  &	  Enforcement	  
The	  relationship	  between	  immigration	  and	  enforcement	  is	  illustrated	  in	  Figure	  3.	  The	  effects	  of	  
immigration	  on	  enforcement	  are	  quite	  different	  from	  its	  protective	  effects	  on	  crime.	  	  Enforcement	  for	  
total,	  violent,	  and	  property	  crimes	  is	  substantially	  higher	  in	  places	  with	  greater	  proportions	  of	  
immigrants.	  This	  effect	  is	  especially	  pronounced	  for	  newer	  immigrants,	  those	  who	  have	  been	  in	  the	  
country	  for	  fewer	  than	  five	  years.	  Although	  crime	  is	  on	  balance	  lower	  in	  neighborhoods	  with	  higher	  
immigrant	  concentrations,	  the	  ratio	  of	  stops	  and	  arrests	  to	  crime	  is	  higher	  in	  these	  same	  places.	  The	  
police	  response	  per	  crime	  seems	  to	  be	  more	  aggressive	  and	  legally	  formal	  in	  immigrant	  neighborhoods,	  
despite	  the	  lower	  crime	  rates	  in	  these	  neighborhoods.	  The	  reasons	  for	  this	  disparity	  are	  neither	  obvious	  
nor	  unambiguous.	  	  For	  example,	  one	  effect	  of	  the	  higher	  enforcement	  rates	  in	  immigrant	  neighborhoods	  
may	  be	  lower	  crime	  overall,	  a	  trend	  we	  observed	  in	  Figures	  1	  and	  2.	  But	  the	  higher	  crime	  rates	  in	  Black	  
neighborhoods	  generally	  are	  not	  observed	  here:	  immigration	  exerts	  a	  protective	  effect	  on	  crime	  for	  
Black	  and	  White	  immigrants,	  yet	  both	  groups	  are	  policed	  less	  intensively	  compared	  to	  Latino	  or	  Asian	  
neighborhoods.	  Still,	  the	  effect	  of	  enforcement	  on	  crime	  is	  difficult	  to	  statistically	  identify	  and	  remains	  
ambiguous	  absent	  a	  more	  complete	  empirical	  understanding	  of	  the	  simultaneous	  relationships	  among	  
police	  stops,	  race	  or	  ethnicity,	  immigration	  and	  crime.	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The	  disaggregation	  of	  race-­‐	  and	  ethnic-­‐specific	  effects	  presented	  in	  Figure	  4	  further	  complicates	  
the	  enforcement	  narrative.	  No	  particular	  group	  is	  driving	  the	  overall	  results	  from	  Figure	  3;	  that	  is,	  the	  
higher	  rates	  of	  enforcement	  activity	  are	  not	  concentrated	  among	  immigrants	  of	  particular	  
races/ethnicities.	  Latino	  and	  Asian	  locales	  experience	  higher	  enforcement	  ratios,	  but	  the	  magnitude	  of	  
the	  association	  fails	  to	  reach	  significance.	  Enforcement	  is	  lower	  in	  neighborhoods	  with	  higher	  
concentrations	  of	  White	  immigrants,	  after	  controlling	  for	  crime,	  but	  again	  the	  effect	  is	  negligible.	  Only	  
for	  African	  immigrant	  neighborhoods	  is	  there	  a	  significant	  relationship	  to	  enforcement,	  and	  here	  the	  
effect	  is	  negative:	  enforcement	  in	  Black	  immigrant	  neighborhoods	  is	  far	  lower	  than	  in	  other	  immigrant	  
enclaves.	  	  This	  finding	  is	  quite	  unexpected	  given	  that	  policing	  has	  tended	  to	  be	  a	  central	  feature	  of	  areas	  
populated	  by	  native	  born	  African	  Americans	  (Fagan	  and	  Davies	  2000;	  Fagan,	  Geller,	  Davies,	  and	  West	  
2010;	  Geller	  and	  Fagan	  2010).	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Figure	  5	  shows	  the	  extent	  of	  differences	  in	  enforcement	  patterns	  across	  foreign	  born	  versus	  
native	  born	  Black	  neighborhoods	  in	  New	  York	  City.	  For	  other	  racial/ethnic	  groups,	  the	  rates	  of	  
enforcement	  between	  native	  and	  foreign	  born	  enclaves	  tend	  to	  be	  similar.	  Interestingly,	  for	  both	  Latinos	  
and	  Asians,	  enforcement	  rates	  for	  most	  types	  of	  crime	  are	  marginally	  higher	  in	  native	  born	  areas.	  It	  is	  
only	  in	  White	  immigrant	  neighborhoods	  where	  immigrants	  see	  a	  greater	  concentration	  of	  enforcement.	  
But	  for	  all	  groups,	  the	  differences	  are	  not	  striking,	  as	  the	  ratios	  of	  enforcement	  rates	  generally	  clusters	  
around	  a	  value	  of	  one	  (1).v	  	  Conversely,	  the	  ratios	  in	  African	  areas	  are	  markedly	  higher.	  For	  overall	  crime,	  
the	  rate	  of	  enforcement	  is	  more	  than	  twice	  (2.34)	  as	  large	  in	  native	  born	  neighborhoods;	  the	  ratio	  is	  
higher	  still	  for	  drug	  offenses.	  Simply	  stated,	  largely	  native	  born	  Black	  areas	  experience	  a	  much	  greater	  
concentration	  of	  enforcement	  than	  do	  places	  where	  foreign	  born	  Blacks	  live.	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Consistent	  with	  much	  contemporary	  research,	  this	  study	  confirms	  that	  immigration	  exerts	  a	  
protective	  effect	  on	  crime,	  controlling	  for	  the	  characteristics	  of	  neighborhoods	  that	  tend	  to	  attract	  
immigrants.	  	  In	  New	  York	  and	  other	  cities	  (Sampson	  2008;	  Martinez	  et	  al.,	  this	  volume),	  there	  is	  no	  
evidence	  that	  crime	  rates	  are	  higher	  in	  places	  with	  higher	  immigration	  rates.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  
immigration	  often	  functions	  as	  a	  prophylactic	  against	  crime.	  But	  the	  results	  here	  also	  demonstrate	  that	  
all	  immigrants	  are	  not	  alike;	  immigration	  experiences	  vary	  across	  racial	  and	  ethnic	  groups.	  To	  a	  
considerable	  extent,	  these	  pathways	  are	  influenced	  by	  broader	  patterns	  of	  race	  relations	  in	  the	  US.	  
White	  immigrants	  have	  leveraged	  their	  relative	  advantage	  to	  reside	  in	  areas	  characterized	  by	  higher	  
socio-­‐economic	  status	  and	  lower	  crime,	  while	  Black	  immigrants,	  likely	  facing	  the	  some	  of	  the	  same	  
discriminatory	  forces	  as	  native-­‐born	  Blacks,	  have	  settled	  in	  more	  deprived,	  more	  dangerous	  areas.	  In	  
other	  words,	  when	  disaggregated	  by	  race,	  the	  distributions	  of	  relevant	  characteristics	  in	  immigrant	  
neighborhoods	  closely	  resemble	  those	  evident	  in	  native-­‐born	  neighborhoods.	  
Race,	  however,	  does	  not	  tell	  the	  whole	  story.	  We	  find	  support	  for	  the	  notion	  that	  “culture	  
matters”	  (Kasinitz,	  Mollenkopf,	  Waters,	  and	  Holdaway	  2008).	  It	  is	  true,	  for	  example,	  that	  white	  
immigrants	  such	  as	  Russian	  Jews	  are	  less	  encumbered	  by	  invidious	  discrimination	  in	  housing	  and	  
employment.	  But	  compared	  to	  other	  groups,	  Russian	  Jews	  also	  tend	  to	  be	  more	  urban,	  better	  educated,	  
and	  have	  family	  structures	  (low	  levels	  of	  single-­‐parent	  households	  and	  high	  levels	  of	  intergenerational	  
living)	  that	  are	  more	  to	  amenable	  to	  upward	  mobility	  (Orleck	  2001;	  Kasinitz,	  Mollenkopf,	  Waters,	  and	  
Holdaway	  2008).	  They	  may	  also	  arrive	  here	  with	  more	  capital	  and	  entry	  into	  networks	  of	  well-­‐
assimilated	  predecessors.	  	  At	  odds	  with	  outmoded	  expectations	  of	  social	  disorganization	  and	  crime,	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these	  comparative	  advantages	  help	  explain	  why	  crime	  and	  violence	  are	  less	  prevalent	  in	  white	  
immigrant	  communities.	  
A	  more	  ambiguous	  but	  no	  less	  telling	  example	  of	  cultural	  effects	  involves	  Haitians	  and	  
Jamaicans,	  “West	  Indian”	  groups	  which	  together	  account	  for	  much	  of	  the	  Black	  immigration	  to	  NYC.	  
Haitians	  and	  Jamaicans	  both	  are	  doubly	  stigmatized.	  Phenotypically	  Black,	  both	  groups	  are	  often	  
identified	  simply	  as	  “Black”	  by	  whites	  and	  experience	  discrimination	  and	  residential	  segregation	  similar	  
to	  native-­‐born	  Blacks.	  But	  owing	  to	  differences	  in	  cultures	  and	  languages,	  both	  are	  distinguished	  within	  
the	  Black	  population	  as	  immigrants	  (Stafford	  1987;	  Foner	  1987;	  2007).	  Still,	  this	  “minorities	  within	  a	  
minority”	  status	  has	  not	  increased	  crime	  and	  violence	  in	  Black	  immigrant	  neighborhoods.	  Instead,	  there	  
are	  several	  aspects	  of	  West	  Indian	  life	  that	  appear	  to	  reduce	  crime:	  families	  are	  frequently	  
multigenerational,	  parental	  employment	  rates	  are	  high,	  and	  the	  community	  has	  a	  high	  level	  of	  home	  
ownership	  (Kasinitz,	  Mollenkopf,	  Waters,	  and	  Holdaway	  2008).	  Moreover,	  as	  English	  speakers,	  
Jamaicans	  in	  particular	  are	  able	  to	  employment	  in	  service	  industries.	  	  And	  these	  advantages	  seem	  to	  
translate	  into	  distinctly	  different	  treatment	  of	  immigrants	  of	  African	  descent	  compared	  to	  native	  born	  
African	  Americans.	  
The	  two	  largest	  Latino	  groups,	  Puerto	  Ricans	  and	  Dominicans,vi	  face	  greater	  disadvantages	  than	  
do	  other	  immigrants	  groups,	  in	  terms	  of	  language	  and	  economic	  position	  upon	  entry	  into	  the	  US.	  
However,	  the	  interpretation	  of	  social	  class	  is	  relative.	  Ethnographic	  research	  with	  Dominican	  garment	  
workers	  in	  NYC	  indicates	  that,	  despite	  their	  hardships,	  most	  of	  these	  women	  judged	  their	  social	  status	  to	  
be	  “middle	  class.”	  Pessar	  (1987)	  suggests	  that	  immigrants’	  ability	  to	  secure	  prestigious	  consumer	  goods	  
that	  were	  not	  necessarily	  available	  to	  the	  middle	  class	  in	  the	  Dominican	  provided	  the	  trappings	  of	  a	  
middle	  class	  life	  in	  the	  US.	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  immigrants	  have	  tangibly	  improved	  their	  station	  they	  have	  
vested	  interests	  in	  their	  stable,	  if	  relatively	  poor,	  neighborhoods	  where	  isolation	  is	  both	  spatial	  and	  
social,	  compounding	  their	  economic	  and	  other	  structural	  disadvantages.	  	  
Latino	  immigrants	  from	  South	  America,	  including	  Columbians,	  Ecuadorans,	  and	  Peruvians,	  while	  
encountering	  similar	  barriers	  related	  to	  language,	  nonetheless	  tend	  to	  have	  higher	  levels	  of	  education,	  
two	  parent	  families,	  and	  settle	  in	  less	  distressed	  neighborhoods.	  The	  net	  effect	  of	  Latino	  immigration	  on	  
total	  crime	  is	  negligible;	  it	  is	  negatively	  associated	  with	  violence,	  but	  the	  magnitude	  of	  the	  effect	  is	  not	  
statistically	  significant.vii	  The	  distinct	  social	  worlds	  of	  the	  various	  Latino	  subgroups	  highlight	  the	  need	  for	  
research	  that	  further	  disaggregates	  ethnicity	  by	  sending	  country.	  This	  may	  be	  possible	  in	  the	  future,	  as	  
the	  sizes	  of	  these	  subgroups	  grow.	  
The	  findings	  for	  Asian	  immigration	  are	  similarly	  ambiguous,	  and	  similarly	  illustrate	  the	  need	  for	  
further	  refinement	  in	  the	  categorization	  of	  groups.	  Although	  they	  are	  growing	  quickly,	  Asians	  are	  the	  
smallest	  of	  the	  race/ethnic	  groups.	  This	  is	  reflected	  in	  unique	  residential	  patterns.	  There	  are,	  for	  
example,	  no	  solid	  Korean	  immigrant	  enclaves.	  There	  are	  “medium”	  sized	  settlements	  of	  Koreans	  in	  
Koreatown	  (Manhattan)	  and	  Sunnyside	  (Queens),	  but	  no	  Korean	  analogs	  to	  Dominicans	  in	  Washington	  
Heights	  (Manhattan),	  Puerto	  Ricans	  in	  Spanish	  Harlem	  (Manhattan),	  West	  Indians	  in	  Jamaica	  (Queens)	  
or	  Russians	  in	  Brighton	  Beach	  (Brooklyn).	  This	  is	  not	  merely	  a	  function	  of	  the	  size	  of	  the	  Korean	  
population;	  as	  with	  the	  other	  groups,	  culture	  plays	  a	  role.	  The	  most	  recent	  Korean	  immigrants	  are	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urban,	  well-­‐educated,	  and	  middle	  to	  upper-­‐middle	  class.	  Utilizing	  a	  model	  of	  small	  business	  
entrepreneurship,	  Korean	  immigrants	  have	  taken	  advantage	  of	  opportunities	  in	  commercial	  districts	  in	  
minority	  neighborhoods	  presented	  by	  the	  outflow	  of	  “old	  immigrant”	  shopkeepers	  (Kim,	  1987).	  	  This	  
strategy	  has	  yielded	  tremendous	  economic	  benefit,	  but	  it	  has	  also	  left	  Koreans	  dispersed	  throughout	  the	  
city.	  In	  lieu	  geographic	  proximity,	  Koreans	  have	  embraced	  modern	  institutions,	  including	  business	  
associations	  and	  especially	  the	  Protestant	  Church,	  as	  substitutes	  for	  ethnic	  neighborhoods.	  
There	  is	  no	  mistaking	  the	  centre	  of	  immigrant	  life	  for	  New	  York’s	  Chinese	  population,	  as	  
Manhattan’s	  Chinatown	  has	  continued	  to	  swell	  with	  the	  influx	  of	  settlers.	  Perhaps	  more	  than	  other	  
groups,	  there	  is	  a	  distinct	  “old”	  vs.	  “new”	  dichotomy	  at	  play	  in	  relation	  to	  Chinese	  immigration.	  Once	  
dominated	  by	  “sojourners”	  from	  Kwangtung	  Province,	  many	  of	  the	  post-­‐1965	  arrivals	  originally	  hailed	  
from	  North	  China,	  Shanghai,	  Hong	  Kong,	  Fukien,	  and	  Taiwan	  (Wong,	  1987).	  There	  more	  recent	  arrivals	  
differ	  from	  earlier	  Chinese	  immigrants	  in	  a	  myriad	  of	  ways,	  but	  essentially,	  the	  newer	  immigrants	  
consider	  themselves	  to	  be	  more	  urban,	  literate,	  and	  modern	  than	  their	  predecessors.	  As	  well,	  Cantonese	  
has	  replaced	  the	  Toysan	  dialect	  as	  the	  primary	  means	  of	  communication,	  further	  adding	  to	  
intergenerational	  difficulties.	  The	  superior	  social	  and	  economic	  resources	  of	  the	  current	  wave	  of	  Chinese	  
immigrants	  may	  well	  herald	  lower	  rates	  of	  crime	  as	  they	  become	  a	  larger	  proportion	  of	  the	  population.	  	  
In	  short,	  the	  results	  presented	  here	  support	  the	  emerging	  consensus	  that	  immigration	  does	  not	  
lead	  to	  higher	  rates	  of	  crime,	  and	  in	  some	  instances	  protects	  against	  crime.	  The	  story	  of	  immigration	  and	  
crime	  in	  NYC	  comprises	  many	  chapters	  that	  reflect	  the	  unique	  experiences	  of	  different	  racial	  and	  ethnic	  
groups.	  Each	  of	  the	  groups	  has	  added	  to	  the	  revitalization	  of	  the	  city	  in	  its	  own	  unique	  way,	  through	  
repopulation,	  participation	  in	  niche	  economies,	  and	  entrepreneurial	  spirit.	  The	  nature	  of	  immigration	  
has	  changed.	  At	  the	  very	  least,	  today’s	  newcomers	  are	  better	  positioned	  to	  leverage	  established	  ethnic	  
networks	  for	  employment	  opportunities	  and	  social	  support.	  Writing	  about	  the	  second	  generation	  of	  
post-­‐1965	  immigrants,	  Kasinitz,	  Mollenkopf,	  Waters,	  and	  Holdaway	  (2008:	  63)	  assert	  that	  “the	  parents	  
have	  developed	  cultural	  understandings	  and	  strategic	  repertoires”	  for	  responding	  to	  the	  opportunities	  
and	  challenges	  of	  immigrant	  life.	  These	  understanding	  and	  repertoires	  helped	  to	  maintain	  relatively	  low	  
crime	  rates	  in	  immigrant	  neighborhoods.	  	  	  
Despite	  reduced	  crime,	  however,	  immigrant	  areas	  experience	  disproportionately	  higher	  levels	  of	  
enforcement.	  The	  present	  study	  does	  not	  allow	  for	  definitive	  explanations,	  but	  several	  are	  possible.	  
First,	  immigrant	  neighborhoods	  tend	  to	  be	  geographically	  adjacent	  to	  traditionally	  high-­‐crime	  
neighborhoods.	  Elevated	  enforcement	  practices	  in	  these	  immigrant	  areas	  may	  reflect	  a	  spillover	  effect,	  
where	  the	  crime	  risks	  associated	  proximate	  neighborhoods	  are	  also	  attributed	  to	  immigrant	  
neighborhoods.	  Second,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  the	  police	  are	  reacting	  to	  immigrant	  status	  of	  the	  
neighborhood.	  Extending	  the	  idea	  of	  neighborhood	  racial	  stigma	  (Sampson	  and	  Raudenbush	  2004),	  the	  
police	  may	  see	  and	  interpret	  disorder	  and	  crime	  risk	  differently	  in	  neighborhoods	  marks	  by	  higher	  
concentrations	  of	  immigrants.	  Immigration,	  like	  race,	  may	  be	  imbued	  with	  social	  meaning	  that	  leads	  to	  
greater	  exercise	  of	  coercive	  authority.	  	  
As	  with	  crime,	  the	  results	  of	  this	  study	  also	  underscore	  the	  importance	  of	  disaggregating	  the	  
relationship	  between	  immigration	  and	  enforcement.	  Of	  particular	  interest	  is	  the	  significant	  negative	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association	  for	  Black	  immigrants.	  We	  can	  only	  speculate	  about	  the	  reasons	  for	  this	  finding.	  Reduced	  
enforcement	  in	  Black	  immigrant	  neighborhoods	  may	  be	  indicative	  of	  underpolicing	  (Kane,	  2005).	  These	  
areas,	  which	  are	  particularly	  socially	  isolated	  (even	  in	  relation	  to	  other	  immigrant	  neighborhoods)	  and	  
have	  limited	  political	  capital,	  may	  experience	  a	  form	  of	  “malign	  neglect”	  in	  the	  form	  of	  attenuated	  police	  
resources.	  Future	  research	  should	  further	  investigate	  the	  nature	  of	  this	  relationship,	  and	  whether	  it	  is	  
unique	  to	  New	  York	  City.	  	  
The	  policy	  implications	  of	  this	  study	  are	  complicated,	  not	  unexpectedly	  given	  the	  complexity	  of	  
the	  associations	  between	  immigration,	  crime,	  and	  enforcement.	  The	  results	  presented	  here	  add	  further	  
voice	  to	  the	  growing	  chorus	  cautioning	  against	  the	  politically	  simplistic	  and	  expedient	  scapegoating	  of	  
immigrants.	  The	  stereotypical	  but	  erroneous	  linkage	  between	  immigration	  and	  crime	  is	  increasingly	  
unsustainable,	  especially	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  it	  may	  be	  implicated	  in	  unduly	  highly	  levels	  of	  enforcement.	  
There	  are	  dangers	  in	  this	  disparity	  for	  the	  second	  and	  later	  generations	  of	  immigrants	  who	  experience	  
more	  intrusive	  policing	  regimes	  as	  native	  born	  New	  Yorkers,	  yet	  who	  are	  not	  as	  involved	  in	  crime.	  The	  
potential	  alienation	  of	  immigrant	  communities—even	  law	  abiding,	  cooperative	  individuals—from	  the	  
criminal	  justice	  system	  can	  compromise	  safety	  through	  the	  loss	  of	  legitimacy	  and	  the	  withdrawal	  of	  
citizens	  from	  cooperation	  with	  the	  police	  (Kirk,	  Papachristos,	  Fagan,	  and	  Tyler,	  this	  volume).	  	  	  
Cooperation	  with	  the	  police	  is	  an	  essential	  component	  of	  the	  production	  of	  security	  (Tyler	  and	  Fagan,	  
2008),	  whereby	  citizens	  undertake	  both	  individual	  and	  collective	  actions	  to	  control	  crime.	  	  Cooperation	  
and	  security	  are	  closely	  tied	  for	  all	  racial	  groups,	  whether	  immigrants	  or	  native	  born.	  Cooperation	  
implies	  collaboration	  with	  the	  police,	  and	  trust	  in	  the	  police	  is	  a	  predicate	  for	  such	  actions.	  Differential	  
policing	  of	  immigrant	  neighborhoods	  when	  crime	  rates	  suggest	  otherwise	  corrodes	  trust,	  and	  creates	  
risks	  for	  crime	  both	  now	  and	  in	  the	  future	  as	  immigrants	  take	  their	  place	  in	  American	  society.	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Table	  1.	  	  Modal	  Neighborhood	  Comparisons	  for	  Foreign-­‐Born	  Populations	  







	  Variables	   Mean	   SD	   Mean	   SD	   Mean	   SD	   Mean	   SD	  
Foreign	  Born	  2000	  (%)	   29.56	   13.31	   37.20	   16.21	   48.47	   11.50	   3.49	   14.89	  
Foreign	  Born	  1990	  (%)	   22.08	   12.79	   28.87	   14.51	   36.04	   12.30	   25.20	   12.23	  
Black	  (%)	   54.87	   23.94	   22.44	   22.28	   5.77	   8.16	   5.61	   9.75	  
Latino	  (%)	   27.69	   19.21	   34.52	   16.09	   22.33	   17.10	   17.21	   15.20	  
Asian	  (%)	   4.37	   7.23	   11.76	   13.69	   2.58	   3.44	   12.59	   12.24	  
White	  (%)	   8.12	   13.37	   25.03	   22.81	   44.34	   23.21	   61.15	   22.41	  
Poverty	  (%)	   27.67	   12.69	   24.81	   13.47	   16.60	   9.07	   13.01	   1.74	  
Public	  Assistance	  (%)	   12.99	   7.75	   1.12	   7.90	   4.78	   3.47	   3.26	   3.75	  
Gini	  Index	   .44	   .07	   .42	   .06	   .38	   .07	   .33	   .08	  
Less	  than	  High	  School	  (%)	   34.20	   11.53	   33.96	   11.95	   27.17	   11.64	   19.01	   12.60	  
Unemployment	  (%)	   14.83	   7.54	   11.84	   7.50	   7.29	   3.22	   6.20	   4.15	  
Not	  in	  Labor	  Force	  (%)	   45.09	   7.42	   45.04	   9.01	   42.81	   6.89	   38.52	   1.81	  
Female	  Headed	  Households	  (%)	   17.74	   8.81	   13.13	   9.33	   5.79	   3.71	   4.70	   4.36	  
Supervision	  Ratio	   .64	   .18	   .58	   .20	   .47	   .13	   .41	   .23	  
White	  Isolation	  Index	   .10	   .14	   .27	   .24	   .46	   .23	   .63	   .21	  
Residential	  Mobility	  (%	  <	  5	  yrs)	   62.36	   7.83	   6.59	   7.76	   6.37	   7.86	   59.83	   11.87	  
Housing	  Vacancy	  Rate	  (%)	   7.93	   5.38	   5.48	   3.87	   3.81	   2.48	   4.78	   3.23	  
Renters	  	  (%)	   71.11	   23.10	   73.31	   19.58	   61.28	   2.65	   58.18	   24.70	  
Population	  (Logged)	   8.09	   .56	   8.17	   .52	   8.21	   .42	   8.14	   .64	  
Average	  Housing	  Price	   29.92	   9.10	   34.96	   19.55	   48.29	   133.48	   62.79	   116.13	  
Average	  Homicide	  Rate	   2.95	   1.79	   1.82	   1.60	   .80	   .65	   .64	   .73	  
Average	  Assault	  Rate	   18.09	   1.35	   12.44	   11.89	   5.32	   3.97	   5.92	   8.16	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Table	  2.	  	  Generalized	  Propensity	  Score	  Models	  –	  Foreign	  Born	  2000,	  Overall	  and	  By	  Race	  
	   Overall	   Black	   Latino	   Asian	   White	  
	   Est.	   	   SE	   Est.	   	   SE	   Est.	   	   SE	   Est.	   	   SE	   Est.	   	   SE	  
Foreign	  Born	  1990	   .139	  ***	   .003	   -­‐.005	  	   .015	   .009	   	   .033	   2.122	  ***	   .205	   .198	  ***	   .018	  
Poverty	  	   -­‐.042	  ***	   .006	   -­‐.087	  *	   .035	   -­‐.175	   *	   .075	   1.164	  *	   .474	   -­‐.144	  ***	   .042	  
Public	  Assistance	   -­‐.014	  **	   .005	   -­‐.253	  ***	   .030	   .340	   ***	   .064	   1.457	  ***	   .404	   .136	  ***	   .036	  
Gini	  Index	   .051	  ***	   .005	   .214	  ***	   .029	   -­‐.183	   **	   .062	   .758	  	   .392	   .285	  ***	   .035	  
%	  Less	  than	  High	  School	   .034	  ***	   .005	   -­‐.403	  ***	   .024	   .656	   ***	   .052	   .327	  	   .328	   -­‐.143	  ***	   .029	  
%	  Unemployment	  	   -­‐.011	  **	   .004	   .016	  ***	   .021	   -­‐.039	   	   .045	   -­‐.500	  	   .284	   -­‐.024	  	   .025	  
%	  Labor	  Force	  Nonparticipation	  	   .003	  	   .004	   -­‐.091	  ***	   .020	   .063	   	   .042	   .820	  **	   .267	   .163	  ***	   .024	  
%	  Female	  Headed	  Households	   -­‐.009	  	   .005	   .383	  ***	   .027	   -­‐.198	   ***	   .058	   -­‐4.638	  ***	   .367	   -­‐.249	  ***	   .033	  
Supervision	  Ratio	  (Pop	  25-­‐50/5-­‐15)	   -­‐.014	  ***	   .003	   .104	  ***	   .019	   -­‐.036	   	   .042	   -­‐1.101	  ***	   .264	   -­‐.075	  **	   .024	  
White	  Isolation	  Index	   -­‐.030	  ***	   .004	   -­‐.561	  ***	   .022	   -­‐.322	   ***	   .047	   -­‐1.666	  ***	   .295	   1.175	  ***	   .026	  
Residential	  Mobility	   -­‐.027	  ***	   .003	   .155	  ***	   .016	   -­‐.296	   ***	   .034	   -­‐2.002	  ***	   .212	   -­‐.132	  ***	   .019	  
Housing	  Vacancy	   -­‐.015	  ***	   .003	   .023	  	   .015	   -­‐.158	   ***	   .031	   -­‐.598	  **	   .198	   -­‐.081	  ***	   .018	  
%	  Renters	   -­‐.021	  ***	   .004	   -­‐.086	  ***	   .023	   .332	   ***	   .050	   -­‐1.986	  ***	   .317	   .035	  	   .028	  
Population	  (Logged)	   -­‐.006	  *	   .003	   .096	  ***	   .015	   .440	   ***	   .032	   2.637	  ***	   .201	   .053	  *	   .018	  
Mean	  Housing	  Sale	  Price	   .000	  	   .002	   .001	  	   .012	   -­‐.078	   **	   .026	   -­‐.045	  	   .166	   -­‐.017	  	   .015	  
Homicide	  Rate	  per	  100,000	   -­‐.007	   	   .004	   .137	  ***	   .020	   -­‐.160	   ***	   .043	   -­‐1.349	  ***	   .274	   -­‐.110	  ***	   .024	  
Assault	  Rate	  per	  100,000	   .003	   	   .003	   -­‐.002	  	   .017	   -­‐.055	   	   .037	   -­‐.107	  	   .233	   -­‐.033	  	   .021	  
Log	  likelihood	   -­‐1811.890	   -­‐1459.010	   -­‐2984.620	   -­‐6622.130	   -­‐1845.390	  
Wald	  chi-­‐square	   5806.540	  ***	   4002.670	  ***	   1783.070	  ***	   1233.480	  ***	   10036.320	  ***	  
*	  p	  <	  .05;	  **	  p	  <	  .01;	  ***	  p	  <	  .001	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Figure	  1.	  	  Effects	  of	  Immigrant	  Concentra8on	  on	  Crime	  by	  
Type	  of	  Crime	  (Z-­‐score)	  
All	  Immigrants	   Recent	  Immigrants	  

















Figure	  2.	  	  Effects	  of	  Immigrant	  Concentra8on	  on	  Crime	  by	  	  
Ethnicity	  (Z-­‐score)	  
Total	  Crime	   Violent	  Crime	  



















Figure	  3.	  	  Effects	  of	  Immigrant	  Concentra8on	  on	  Enforcement	  
by	  Type	  of	  Crime	  (Z-­‐score)	  
All	  Immigrants	   Recent	  Immigrants	  























Figure	  4.	  	  Effects	  of	  Immigrant	  Concentra8on	  on	  Enforcement	  by	  
Ethnicity	  (Z-­‐score)	  
Total	  Crime	   Violent	  Crime	  





































Total	   Violent	   Drug	   Property	  
Source:	  	  U.S.	  Bureau	  of	  the	  Census,	  STF-­‐3A,	  2000;	  New	  York	  City	  Police	  Department,	  Stop	  and	  Frisk	  Archive,	  On-­‐Line	  Booking	  System	  
Figure	  5.	  	  Ra#o	  of	  Enforcement	  in	  Na#ve	  Born	  to	  Foreign	  Born	  Enclaves,	  by	  
Type	  of	  Enforcement	  (2004-­‐8)	  
	   -­‐	  30	  -­‐	  
Endnotes	  
	  
i.	  The	  Omniform	  record	  collects	  the	  200	  pieces	  of	  information	  for	  each	  crime	  complaint	  that	  are	  entered	  
into	  the	  Compstat	  system	  used	  by	  the	  NYPD	  for	  crime	  analysis.	  	  See,	  Office	  of	  the	  Comptroller,	  City	  of	  
New	  York,	  200X.	  
ii.	  	  Since	  the	  arrest	  rates	  pursuant	  to	  street	  stops	  are	  less	  than	  5	  percent,	  there	  is	  little	  overlap	  in	  these	  
two	  measures.	  	  See,	  Fagan,	  Geller,	  Davies,	  and	  West	  (2010).	  
iii.	  	  For	  each	  population	  group,	  census	  tracts	  with	  no	  immigrant	  population	  for	  that	  group	  were	  
excluded.	  The	  remaining	  tracts	  were	  divided	  into	  three	  quantiles.	  Tracts	  in	  the	  second,	  or	  middle,	  
quantile	  were	  categorized	  as	  modal	  neighborhoods.	  	  
iv.	  	  Race-­‐	  and	  ethnic-­‐specific	  models	  also	  include	  the	  interaction	  of	  %	  Foreign	  Born	  with	  the	  GPS	  score.	  
v.	  	  A	  ratio	  of	  1	  indicates	  that	  the	  enforcement	  rate	  in	  native	  born	  enclaves	  is	  equal	  to	  the	  enforcement	  
rate	  in	  foreign	  born	  enclaves.	  
vi.	  	  Although	  geographically	  West	  Indian,	  Dominicans	  are	  ethnically	  Latino.	  
vii.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  there	  is	  substantial	  heterogeneity	  in	  Latino	  populations	  across	  cities.	  The	  
finding	  here	  may	  reflect	  New	  York’s	  specific	  composition,	  and	  the	  effect	  of	  Latino	  population	  may	  vary	  
from	  other	  cities	  with	  different	  compositions.	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